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ABSTRACT
AFDC in Massachusetts
by
Robert Simi
There have been many theories developed for the crisis
in the AFDC program in the United States. Among the most
rominent are Daniel Moynihan's theory on family instabilityi
Piven and Cloward's theory which links the increase in
welfare with the increase in civil disorder and finally
avid Gordon's theory which focuses on increasing benefit
levels overlapping the increase in wage levels. What I have
done is applied these different theories to data obtained for
Boston and when not available for Massachusetts.
My results are that there is a persistence of broken
amilies among nonwhites and that these families along with
white families with low income are making their presence felt
on AFDC. So to approach the AFDC problem, you must approach
the low income family instability problem.
_____________ ----.- .----.-- I
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Introduction
Chanter I
There has been great national concern about the Federal
id to Families with Dependent Children program in the United
States. In 1940, there were 891,000 children supported by
this federal program. By the end of 1966 there were
3,526,000. With parents and caretakers the total came to
4,666,000. (It has now passed five million.) The recipient
rate for children had risen from 22 per 1000 population under
18 years of age to 48. During 1966 the number of such child
ren increased 6.3 percent, and the cost of the program, 17.4
percent. At a monthly cost of 184.6 million, the AFDC program
had now passed Old Age Assistance as the most expensive
federal welfare program and had become perhaps the leading
conundrum of American domestic policy.
Although originally expected to be a "transitional"
program which would wither away as the contributory insurance
components were broadened, AFDC increased dramatically. A
plethora of reasons have accounted for the rise. Important
national trends have included the decline of the agricultural
Daniel Moynihan, Crisis in Welfare, Public Interest,
pg. 5.
6.
sector, which contributed greatly to population mobility,
especially from the south, and urbanization. A corollary of!
industrialization, mobility and urbanization has been the
decline of extended families, which previously looked after
their own. A number of other more specific contributing
forces can, however, be identified. Population has been
broadened; welfare agencies look more favorable on welfare
recipients; public assistance has become more attractive
relative to earning, and the contributing have not taken over
2
nealy as fast as AFDC has grown.
Along with the above theories of AFDC growth there has
been an ample amount of material published to back these
theories. Among the most popular and influential are the
following three. First, Daniel Moynihan's theory which
emphasizes the increase in family instability; second, Piven!
and Cloward's theory which links the increase in welfare
with the increase in civil disorder and finally, David
Gordon's theory which focuses on increasing benefit levels
overlapping the increase in wage levels.
What I would like to attempt in my thesis is to take
the above theories, analyze them individually, then try to
apply them to actual data. Before I can begin the applica-
tions, I must successfully develop a testing procedure for
2
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each theory. When I have completed this preliminary process
then I will apply the validation procedure to data which I ha 1 e
obtained for Boston or Massachusetts depending upon the
availability to the data.
Chart I below illustrates my procedure for each theory.
Chart I
I Detailed analysis and
description of theory
II pevelopment of valid
testing procedure
III Application of procedure
to data for Boston and
when not applicable, to
Massachusetts with a very
brief description of results
Before I move on to the theories, I would like to
present a brief chapter by chapter summary.
Chapter II begins with a description and analysis of
Moynihan's theory which is developed in his controversial st. oy
The Negro Family A Case For National Action. In the second
section of this chapter I will develop a valid testing pro-
cedure for his theory and finally in the third section I
will apply this procedure to data for Boston or Massachusetts.
Chapter III begins with a description and analysis of
Piven and Cloward's theory which is developed in their book
on the functions of Public Welfare entitled Regulating the
8.
Poor. In the second section I will develop a valid procedure
to test their theory and finally in the third section I willi
apply this test to data for Boston or Massachusetts.
Chapter IV begins with a description and analysis of
David Gordon's theory which is developed in his article in
the Public Interest entitled Income and Welfare in New York
City. In the second section I will develop a valid procedure
to test his theory and finally in the third section I will
apply this test to data for Boston or Massachusetts.
Chapter V begins with conclusions based on my results
along with the policy implications that are involved. I
conclude my thesis by making a few suggestions for future
research.
11
Chapter II
The first section of this chapter will contain a detail-T
ed summary of Daniel Moynihan's report entitled "The Negro
Family" The Case for National Action. This first half will
also include any personal comments or analysis which I wish
to submit, In the second section of this chapter I will
attempt determining a valid testing procedure for Moynihan'sK
theory and finally in the third section I will apply this
test to data which I have obtained for Massachusetts.
The Negro Family
The Case for National Action
After the Civil Rights Act of 1964 many administration
officials in Washington felt that this act had solved a good!'
part of the civil rights problem. But there was a sharp
contrast between this optimistic mood and the depressing
figures on social and economic status. So late in November
of 1964 Daniel Moynihan decided to write a report on the
Negro family for internal use in the government:
I woke up a couple of nights later (that is, after one
such conversation with a highly placed optimist) at four
o'clock in the morning and felt I had to write a paper about
the Negro family to explain to the fellows how there was a
110.
problem more difficult than they knew and also to explain
some of the issues of unemployment and housing in-terms that,,
would be new enough and shocking enough that they would say, K
"Well, we can't let this sort of thing go on. We've got to
do something about it."
Moynihan sought to present a sharply focused argument
leaning to the conclusion that the government's economic
and social welfare programs existing and prospective ones,
should be systematically designed to encourage the stabilityl
2
of the Negro family.
With this brief introduction I will now proceed to ex-
plain and analyze in detail Moynihan's report.
The first chapter discusses the Negro American Revolu-
tion beginning with the political, administrative and legal
events which occurred to make the movement possible.
The political events were three. First, the Negroes
themselves organized as a mass movement. Second, the
Kenne1y-Johnson Administration committed the federal govern-!
to the cause of Negro equality. This had never happened
before. Third, the 1964 presidential election was practic-
ally a referendum on this commitment; if these were terms
Rainwater and Yancy, The Moynihan Report and the
Politics of Controversy, pg. 26.
2
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made by the opposition, they were in effect accepted by the
3
president.
The administrative events were threefold as well.
First, beginning with the establishment of the president's
committee on Equal Employment Opportunity and on to the
enactment of the Manpower Development and Training Act of
1962, the federal government has launched a major national
effort to redress the profound imbalance between the economic
position of the Negro citizens and the rest of the nation
that derives primarily from their unequal position in the
labor market. Second, the Economic Opportunity Act of 1964
began a major national effort to abolish poverty, a condition
in which almost half of Negro families are living. Third,
the Civil Rights Act of 1964 marked the end of the era of
legal and formal discrimination against Negroes and created
important new machinery for combating covert discrimination
4
and unequal treatment.
The legal events were no less specific. Beginning with
Brown vs. Board of Education in 1954, through the decade
that culminated in the recent decisions upholding title II
3
Daniel Moynihan, The Moynihan Report "The Negro Family,"
pg. 1.
4
Ibid., pg. 2.
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of the Civil Rights Act, the federal judiciary, led by the 11
Supreme Court,'has used every opportunity to combat unequal
treatment on Negro citizens. It may be put as a general
proposition that the laws of the United States now look upon H
any such treatment as obnoxious and that the courts will
5
strike it down wherever it appears.
With these events as a background the Negro now faces
the problem of attaining not only opportunity but actual
results. As Nathan Glazer has put it, "The demand for
economic equality is now not the demand for equal opportun-
ities for the equally qualified: it is now the demand for
equality of economic results...the demand for equality in
education ...has also became a demand for equality of results,'
6
of outcomes.
Surprizing as it may seem there are no real federal
programs that insure the outcome. They all only make
opportunities available.
Moynihan concludes his first chapter by commenting on
the prospect for equality. In order to insure the Negro hisH
proper place in society there must be something done about
his social structure, in particular the Negro family. This
5
Ibid., pg. 2.
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leads directly to the second chapter which focuses on the
Negro American family.
Moynihan claims that at the heart of the deterioration
of the fabric of Negro society is the deterioration of the
Negro family. And furthermore since the family is the basic
socializing unit of American life social policy should be
aimed in that direction.
He makes an interesting point about what the mass media'!
and the development of suburbia have done to the image of
the American family. They have created it as being a highly
standardized phenomena. Therefore it is easy to assume thatl
a difference in family structure is not a cause for differ-
ence among individuals or groups of individuals.
But in actuality there is one truly great discontinuity
in family structure in the United States, that between the
white world in general and that of the Negro American. The
white family has achieved a high degree of stability and is
maintaining that stability. By contrast, the family struc-
ture of lower class Negroes is highly unstable, and in many
7
urban centers is approaching complete breakdown.
In order to substantiate the above statement about
Negro family instability Moynihan includes data on dissolved
7
Daniel Moynihan, Op. cit., pg. 5.
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marriages, illegitimacy and female-headed families. This of
course assumes that these are valid indicators of family
instability. I do not question this assumption and I would
like to include Moynihan's charts about Negro family instab-
ility for two reasons. First, for illustrative purposes and
second, so that I am able to comment on them effectively.
He begins by stating that nearly a quarter of urban
Negro marriages are dissolved and uses Chart I to support
his argument. The figures are certainly convincing but I
would be interested in seeing the results if the below
table were crosstabulated with income. I'm wondering if
family instability and dissolved marriages may be more
associated with economic factors rather than race. Or put
in a different manner, would the below differences disappear'
if the table only considered white and non white families
with income levels less than some arbitrary low value such h
as $4,000.
Chart I
Percent Distribution of Ever-Married Females with Husbands
Absent or Divorced, Rural-Urban, 1960
Urban Rural nonfarm Rural farm
Total, husbands absent or
divorced...........
Total, husbands aosent.,
Separated.......
Husbands absent for
other reasons..
Tocal, divorced......
Nonwhite white Nonwhite White Nonwhite White
._22.9 7.9 14.7 5.7 9.6 3.0
17.3 3.9 12.6 3.6 8.6 2.0
.12.7 . l&. 7.8 1.2 5.6 0.5
4.6 . 2.a 4.8 2.4 3.0 1.5
5.6 4.0 2.1 2.1 1.0 1.0
SougC.e U.S. Census of Population, 1960, Nonwhite Population by Race, PC (2) 1e,
table 9, pp. 9-10.
I15. __
The next factor Moynihan considers is illegitimacy. He
claims that nearly one quarter of Negro births are now
illegitimate. Both white and Negro illegitimacy rates have
been increasing, although from dramatically different bases.
The white rate was 2 percent in 1940; it was 3.07 percent in
1963. In that period, the Negro rate went from 16.8 percent
8
to 23.6 percent.
As chart II indicates there is no real discrepancy on
the rate of increase since 1940 between whites and non-white'j.
If the chart could be extended back in time I'm sure the
results would be quite fruitful. Also if the chart could be 1
duplicated holding income constant you might possibly see
the discrepancy in the base disappear.
Chart II
a LLEGITI'MATE.BIRYHS .PER THOUSA'ND BIRTS
300. P: A-:,:
940 4 '3 4 5 14#,.- 8!, 5 2 4'5'6 75 5 6 162.6
8
Ibid., pg. 8.
16.
As a direct result of the high rate of divorce, seper-
ation and desertion almost one fourth of Negro families are
headed by females. While the percentage of such families
among whites has been dropping since 1940, it has been
9
rising among Negroes.
Chart III illustrates the rising incidence of single
headed families with women among Negroes. Again a cross-
tabulation with income might present different results.
Chart III
E P~t&N F 4 &#rt 9Aitt
AI'&M A WU,#A
NONWHITE FAMILIES
20 HEADED BYAWOMAN
,,20
.w .
WHITE FAMILIES 
1949 '1960 1961 J 962.. 5~ 195d. 1V9 495 ''Z1V1960 .1961, 1962
9
Ibid., pg. 9. h
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Another measure of family instability is children
reaching the age of 18 having lived all their lives with
both their parents. For Negroes this figure not only repre-
sents a majority of the children but is also steadily increa+
sing.
To complete the cycle the breakdown of the Negro family
has led to a startling increase in Welfare dependency. At
present, 14 percent of Negro children are receiving AFDC
assistance, as against 2 percent of white children. Eight
percent of white children receive such assistance at some
time, as against 56 percent of nonwhites, according to an
10
extrapolation based on HEW data.
Moynihan concludes his second chapter on the Negro
family with a very powerful hypothesis; the steady expansion
of the AFDC program, as of public assistance programs in
general, can be taken as a measure of the steady disintegra-:
tion of the Negro family structure over the past generation
11
in the United States.
In the third chapter of his report, Moynihan considers
the possible roots of the Negro family disintegration
10
Ibid., pg. 12.
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problem. He traces it back to the period of American history
when slavery was in existence. American slavery was pro-
foundly different from, and in its lasting effects on indivi-
uals and their children, indescribably worse than any record
ed servitude ancient or modern.
In his report, Moynihan takes an excerpt from Nathan
Glazer comparing Brazilian and American slavery.
In Brazil, the slave had many more rights than in the
United States: he could legally marry, he could, indeed had
to, be baptized and become a member of the Catholic church,
his family could not be broken up for sale and he had many
days on which he could either rest or earn money to buy his
freedom. The Government encouraged manumission and the
freedom of infants could often be purchased for a small sum
at the baptismal font. In short: the Brazilian slave knew
he was a man and that he differed in degree, not in kind,
from his master.
In the United States the slave was totally removed fromi
the protection of organized society (compare the elaborate
provisions for the protection of slaves in the Bible), his
existence as a human being was given no recognition by any
religious or secular agency, he was totally ignorant of and
completely cut off from his past, and he was offered
--. I
119.
absolutely no hope for the future. His children could be
sold, his marriage was not recognized, his wife could be
violated or sold (there was something comic about calling
the woman with whom the master permitted his to live a
"wife"), and he could also be subject, without redress, to
frightful barbarities--there were presumably as many sadists
among slaveowners, men and women, as there are in other
groups. The slave could not, by law, be taught to read or
write; he could not practice any religion without the
permission of his master, and could never meet with his
fellows, for religious or any other purposes, except in the
presence of a white; and finally, if a master wished to free
him, every legal obstacle was used to thwart such action.
This was not what slavery meant in the ancient world, in
medieval and early modern Europe, or in Brazil and the West
12
Indies.
Moynihan continues by drawing from Pettigrew and
emphasizing the lasting and destructive effects of American
Slavery on the Negro family.
Psychologists point out that slavery in all its forms
sharply lowered the need for achievement in slaves.. .Negroes
in bondage, stripped of their African heritage, were placed
12
Nathan Glazer, "Introduction" Slavery, pg. 9-10.
i20.
in a completely dependent role. All of their rewards came,
not from individual initiative and enterprise, but from
absolute obedience--a situation that severely depresses the
need for achievement among all peoples. Most important of
all, slavery vitiated family life .. .since many slaveowners
neither fostered Christian marriage among their slave
couples nor hesitated to separate them on the auction block,
the slave household often developed a fatherless matrifocal K
13
(mother-centered) society.
Once the slave was emancipated, any effort by the
Negro male to regain his masculinity and father-figure were
severely thwarted. The "sassy" nigger was lynched. So the
Negro women continued her role as the dominant member in the
Negro family.
Urbanization has also played an important part in the
destruction of the Negro family. E. Franklin Frazier des-
cribes this effect in his book The Negro Family in the United
States.
In many cases, of course, the dissolution of the simple'
family organization has begun before the family reaches the
northern city. But, if these families have managed to pre-
13
Thomas F. Pettigrew, Profile of the Negro American, pc. 13.
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serve their integrity until they reach the northern city,
poverty, ignorance and color force them to seek homes in
deteriorated slum areas from which practically all institu-
tional life has disappeared. Hence, at the same time that
these simple rural families are losing their internal
cohesion, they are being freed from the controlling force ofli
public opinion and communal institutions. Family desertion 11
among Negroes in cities appears, then, to be one of the
inevitable consequences of the impact of urban life on the
simple family organization and folk culture which the Negro
has evolved in the rural south. The distribution of deser-
tions in relation to the general economic and cultural
organization of Negro cummunities that have grown up in our
American cities shows in a striking manner the influence of I
selective factors in the process of adjustment to the urban
14
environment.
II
In every index of family pathology--divorce, separationi
and desertion, female family-head, children in broken homes
and illegitimacy--the contrast between the urban and rural
environment for Negro families is unmistakable.
Still another factor in determining the stability of the
Negro family is unemployment. As chart IV and V indicate
14
Franklin Frazier, The Negro Family in the United
States, pg. 340-341.
22.
there is definitely a relationship between unemployment rate v
and separated women. An interesting point is that there is
a one-year lag between unemployment and separation. This
could mean that Negro families tend to stay together for a
year despite unemployment.
In general terms, Negro families have the largest numbe
of children and the lowest incomes and therefore, many Negro
fathers literally cannot support their families.
Because the father is either not present, is unemployed,
or makes such a low wage, the Negro woman goes to work.
Fifty-six percent of Negro women, age 25 to 64, are in the
work force, against 42 percent of white women. This depend-l
ence on the mother's income undermines the position of the
father and deprives the children of the kind of attention,
particularly in school matters, which is now a standard
15
feature of middle-class upbringing.
(Charts IV and V on next page.)
15
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Chart IV
co "ITE MALE
COMApUso-. Ou Ui MPLOYMENT, RAT4,"NOrNWH-~MAE
A AD14, AND' WVI'Ti P CENVOF NO' kWfti2r AAARMEDAi) EOMN
.1 ,t.,CY GN RAV 16 ?g
I' '.
VIPI
N@"4TS 56PARAT60 WOMEN.
.'S 44 4 9 ,,0 : 6
ONE' PLYEN'M r- NONIVNTE MI PA LES"
L 'AGECD) N4 AD' OV ERpIpk; R, PC LNT 0 p NWHl Ir AARR womcEN
NONWHITE SPARATED WOMEN .-.
0,k
~ ~'2:,.i' : ~~S0*'' 9, All
Chartj
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The worst part of the problem is that the dimensions
are increasing due to the extraordinary growth of the Negro
population. Since 1950, the Negro population has grown at
a rate of 2.4 percent per year compared with 1.7 percent for
the total population. If this rate continues, in 7 years,
one American in eight will be nonwhite.
A cycle is at work; too many children too early make it
most difficult for the parents to finish school. Low educa-'
tion levels in turn produce low income levels, which deprive
children of many opportunities, and so the cycle repeats
itself.
In the fourth chapter Moynihan elaborates on this tangle
of pathology. Although nearly half of the Negro population
is considered middle-class, most of the children in these
families usually do not escape the influence of the unstable
lower class. Therefore, they are constantly exposed to the
pathology of the disturbed group and constantly in danger ofi
being drawn into it. This is truly unfortunate because E.
Franklin Frazier has suggested that the middle-class Negro
American family is, if anything, more patriarchal and
protective of its children than the general run of such
16
families.
16
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The next point that Moynihan continues to develop is that
of Negro matriarchy. A fundamental fact of Negro American
family life is the often reversed rolesrof husband and wife.
This is true not only in family life but also in education
and employment. As charts VI and VII indicate Negro females
stay in school longer (VI) and tend not to fall behind as
much as the male (VII). Again it would be interesting to sel
if these results differed if you held income constant.
Chart VI Chart VII
Educational Attainment of the Civilian
Noninstitutional Population '18 Years
of Age and Over, March '1964
Color and 'sex 'Median school years completed
White:
Male . . 12.1
Female. is 12.1
Nonwhite:
Male . 9.2
Female . . 10.0
Percent of Nonwhite Youth Enrolled in School
Who are 'I or More Grades Below Mode for
Age, by Sex, '1960
Age Male Female
7 to 9 years old 7.8 5.8
10 to 13 years old 25.0 17.1
14 and 15 years old 35.5 24.8
16 and 17 years old 39.4 27.2
18 and 19 years old 57.3 46.0
' Sources 1960 Census, School Enroilmnse,
PC(2) 5A, table 3, p. 24.
Sources Bureau of Labor Statiecs, unpub'e
ished dea.
As a result of this higher education attainment Negro
females gain better employment and more income as Chart VIII
indicates.
Chart VIII
WHITE NEGRO-TOTAL
EMPLOYEES -.. . - -
k 0000
MALE
4000,-0
FEMALE
3000 -,r.e -
- 2000 -
-
FEMALE
1000 MALE
APPROXIMATE
;AVERAGE SALARY $9,240 $5,875 $6,000 SS,530
AVERAGEpRADE 11.26 6.29 . 6.81 4.84
yThis Is Nen..' .n4 may .nflude same nonwhtes.oetheftn Nege.
::; *~*~~ Set., Sq A Iow~.ab )V.
Not only do Negroes attain a lower level of education
but they also tend to perform lower on intelligence tests.
Eighth grade children in central Harlem have a median IQ of
87.7 which means that perhaps a third of the children are
scoring at levels perilously near to those of retardation.
Although this is a very startling statistic, it is debatable
whether or not the IQ is a fair measure of intelligence.
I.
____ 27.
A variable which seems important in enhancing the
performance of students is the presence of the father in the
home. The IQ's for males, females and a combined group with !
fathers in the home are always higher than those who have noiH
17
father in the home.
Moynihan concludes this fourth chapter by commenting
on the effect of broken homes on juvenille delinquency and
crime. The combined impact of poverty, failure and isolation'
among Negro youth has had the predictable outcome in a
disastrous delinquency and crime rate.
The Armed Forces could play an essential role in
restoring the masculinity absent in the Negro male but
unfortunately, due to the Armed Forces Mental Test, many
Negroes do not qualify. This test roughly measures ability
that ought to be found in an average 7th or 8th grade student .
A grown young man who cannot pass this test is in trouble.
Fifty-six percent of Negroes fail it.
In his final chapter Moynihan states his Case for Nat-
tional Action. The purpose of his study was to define a
problem rather than propose solutions to it. The reasons
being that just, some feel that the problem does not exist,
second, that the problem is too interrelated and finally
17
Deutch and Brown, Social Issues, pg. 27.
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many feel that the problem may be out of control. With
hese in mind Moynihan simply states what the national effor
should be directed at. Namely, the question of family
structure. He concludes his report with the following
statement.
The policy of the United States is to bring the Negro
merican to full and equal sharing in the responsibilities
and rewards of citizenship. To this end, the programs of the
ederal government bearing on this objective shall be designed
to have the effect, directly or indirectly, of enhancing
18
the stability and resources of the Negro American family.
I will now begin attempting to determine a valid testing
rocedure for Moynihan's theory on the breakdown of the
Negro family. I will be applying this method to the state ofi
Massachusetts in the third section.
Probably the best approach would be the utilization of
regression analysis with the incidence of AFDC as a possible
dependent variable and female-headed families, dissolved
arriages and illegitimacy as possible :independent variables.
But due to two reasons, I was not able to use regression
analysis.
First, although I do have substantial knowledge about
the regression process I was unable to obtain computer time.
18
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Second, even if I did manage to acquire some computer time,
the data necessary was simply unavailable.
Below I have offered a possible equation for welfare
incidence. The purpose of illustrating this equation is to
give an indication of how difficult a welfare relationship
could be. Equations 1, 2 and 3 are taken from Elizabeth
Durbin's Doctoral Dissertation entitled Family Instability,
Labor Supply and The Incidence of Aid to Families with
Dependent Children.
(1)
WADC a + b a + (b + b + b) (R) + (bg + b b ) (C)
+ (b + b, b3 ) (Y) + (b + b10 b) (Sm)
+ bt5 (Sf) + (b1 + b 0 lbb) (0) + b, b7 (X) + E
The variables are defined as follows:
WADC = Incidence of ADC recipi6nts in the population.
R = Rejection Rate of ADC applications.
C = Proportion of dependent children, or the popula-1
tion under 18 years of age divided by the popula'
tion 18 - 64.
Y = Current family income.
Sm = Proportion of unskilled males in total male
employment'.
_________________ II ________________
-11 _30_
Sf = Proportion of unskilled females in total female
employment.
o = Proportion of persons over the age of 65 in the
population over 65, as a control variable for
both Fund WADC.
X = Exogenous factor affecting the proportion of
female-headed families.
and E = Error terms.
Actually equation (1) was a combination of equations
(2) and (3) where F represents the proportion of female-
headed households.
(2)
F = a, + bj (F) + b (C) + b (Y) + b I (Sm)
+ bb(O) + b1 (X) + Eg
(3)
WADC = a + b (F) + b (R) + b (C) + b (Y)
+ bI (Sm) + b15 (Sf) + bi (0) + E
19
19
Elizabeth Durbin, Family Instability, Labor Supply and
the Incidence of Aid to Families with Dependent Children,
pg. 136-8.
As you can see her equations also include other socio-
economic variables. If I attempted using a similar equation'
I would probably have little time or effort remaining to
examine the other two hypotheses.
Despite the many variables that Moynihan cites in his
study the one that seems the most important in the continu- I
ance of family pathology among Negroes is female-headed
families. So in testing Moynihan's theory, I will concen-
trate on this variable.
I will begin by observing data on Massachusetts from
the 1960 apd 1970 Bureau of the Census Reports focusing on
the number of families which are both female-headed and which
possess children under the age of eighteen. This will
include female-headed families that have been separated
legally or illegally, widowed, divorced or single. Once
anyone of these situations prevailed the family is automat-
20
ically eligible for AFDC payment.
So what these figures for 1960 and 1970 represent is
the "risk population." Namely, families which possibly
could be included in the AFDC rolls. My first observation
would be noting if the female-headed families have increased
20
Although there are two exceptions; first, if the fami y
income or assets are over the maximum level and second, since
the -pass qe-f-the---AF-I)rtP---r r-am-ther-e-may _ _ _--iarnn7--
-re -ntA9_ --....- .e..
proportionately from 1960 to 1970. In this observation I
will also include figures which represent total families,
white families and nonwhite families. Ideally I would also
have liked to crosstabulate with an income variable but agait
the data was unavailable.
The second step in the process will be to observe the
change in the number of broken families on AFDC. Broken
families as opposed to families who are on AFDC due to the
death, incapacity or unemployment of the husband. The
Department of Health, Education and Welfare, Social and
Rehabilitation Services published documents entitled Finding
of the 1961 AFDC Study and Findings of the 1971 AFDC Study
which include such data. But there are two major problems.
First, the 1961 publication does not include data for Massach
usetts and second, there is no categorization by race. I
have posed a few assumptions that could correct these
difficulties.
The final step in the process will be to compare the
female-headed families on AFDC with the total number of
female-headed families. This proportion will be calculated
for total families, white families and nonwhite families for
both 1960 and 1970. The reason why I have chosen to make
a distinction between total white and nonwhite families is tq
I
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determine if female-headed families is a race oriented
phenomena.
Chart IX summarizes the process for testing Moynihan's
theory.
Chart IX
I. Total
Proportion of female-headed
families with children aged
less than 18.
White
Proportion of female-headed
families with children aged
less than 18.
Nonwhite
Proportion of female-headed
families with children aged
Change
from
1960 )
to
1970
1960 -1 1970
1960 - > 1970
less than 18.
(Part II and III continued on following
page.)
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II. Total
Proportion of broken families
on AFDC.
White
Proportion of broken families
on AFDC. 1960 ->
Nonwhite
Proportion of broken families
on AFDC.
III.
1960 
->
Total
II/I 1960 )7
White
II/I 1960
Nonwhite
II/I 1960 1970
Although this may not be the most sophisticated testing'
procedure, with the data I have available it is probably the
most effective.
i 34.
Change
from to
1960 ) 1970
1970
1970
1970
1970
II
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In this final section of chapter II I will utilize my
validating procedure on data which I have obtained for
Massachusetts. Due to the unavailability of some of the datal
I will have to modify the procedure as presented on the
previous page. I will explain the modifications as I proceed.
Chart X below summarizes the new approach.
Chart X Change
Total from to
Test (1) Proportion of female-
headed families with
1960 : 1970
children aged less
than 18.
Nonwhite
Proportion of female-
headed families with
1960 -- 1970
children aged less
than 18.
Test (2) Total
Percentage of families
on AFDC which are 1960 1970
"broken families".
Test '(3) Total
Proportion of "total"
1960 1970
broken families on AFDC.
If you compare chart X with chart IX you will see that
the differences occur in the race comparisons. The data wasi
just not available by race.
The validating procedure is comprised of three separate
tests as illustrated above. The first test considers the
proportional change in female-headed families from 1960 to
1970. This includes families which ahve been separated, leg-
ally or illegally, widowed, divorced or single. One may
argue that widows should not be included but for simplicity
purposes they will be included. The 1960 census material only
contained figures for the total and nonwhite families. I
was going to make the assumption that I could determine the
figures for white families by simply subtracting the nonwhite
from the total. But upon testing this assumption for 1970
census data, I discovered I was incorrect. The 1970 census
data had the following breakdown:
Total Families
White Families
Negro Families
Persons of spanish speaking Families
Unfortunately for some unknown reason the columns did
not total so I did not make the assumption for the 1960
census data.
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Chart XI considers the change in female-headed families
from 1960 to 1970 for total families and for nonwhite
families for Massachusetts.
Chart XI
Total families
1960
percent
1,292,404
Married male
wife present
1,107,160
85.7
Broken families
including male-head
185,244
14.3
1970 1,390,982 1,176,221 214,761
percent 84.6 15.4
Nonwhite
1960 27,047 19,693 7,354
percent 72.8 27.2
1970 38,319 23,681 14,638
percent 61.8 38.2
Source - 1960 Bureau of Census Special Characteristics of
Massachusetts.
1970 Bureau of Census Special Characteristics of
Massachusetts.
These figures do tend to support Moynihan's argument
that the broken families do increase from 14.3 to 15.4 per
in
cent for the total families and 27.2 to 38.2 for the nonwhit&
families. But these figures in chart XI also include
38.
female-headed families which do not possess any children
and therefore would not be eligible for any AFDC benefits.
Chart XII illustrates the proportional change for
families with children.
Chart XII
Total
Broken families with children Total Proportion of
1 child 2 children 3 or over total families
1960 26,073 16,089 14,691 56,853 4.5 per-
centage
1970 34,949 24,519 29,584 89,052 6.4 change
42.2
Nonwhite
1960 1,409 1,132 1,703 4,244 15.8 ner-
centage
1970 3,415 2,945 4,570 10,930 28.5 change
80.5
Source - Same as chart XI
Although the results for the total families figure
mildly supports Moynihan's theory, the results for the
nonwhite families is more convincing. By just observing the
20
percentage change you would have to admit that the broken
families phenomona is more common in nonwhite families. If
20
For total families 6.4 - 4.5 = 1.9 as a percentage of '
4.5 and for nonwhite 28.5 - 15.8 = 12.7 as a percentage of
1139.
you isolate the nonwhite data you can see that while the num-
ber of families increased by less than half the number of
broken families doubled while the number of broken families
with children increased by two and a half.
The second test involves observing the change in
percentages of the broken families on AFDC from 1961 to 1971
Again a major problem has arisen with the data. In the 1961
HEW study entitled Findings of the 1961 AFDC Study there was
no data included for Massachusetts. So I made a couple of
assumptions then computed the data for Massachusetts. The
assumptions were first, that the percentage figures for
each category in Massachusetts were identical to the ones
for New England. This is a rather weak assumption so I willK
also include the national percentage figures to strenghten
the test. Second, since I needed a total family AFDC figure
for Massachusetts, I went ahead and extrapolated what the
figure would be assuming that the AFDC families in Massach-
usetts grew propotionately to the AFDC families in New
England or stated mathematically ....
AFDC families in AFDC families in
NE in 1961 = Mass. in 1961
AFDC families in AFDC families in
NE in 1971 Mass. in 1971
140.
So with these assumptions, I produced the data illus-
trated in chart XIV (which is on the following page).
Another problem that arose, as mentioned before, was
that there was no categorization by race. The remaining two
tests will only include a total figure.
Chart XIII illustrates the results for the second test
mentioned above. This includes families which are on AFDC
due to divorce, separation, desertion, not married to mother
and absent for other reasons.
Chart XIII
Nation Mass.
1961 62.4 72.8
1971 74.1 77.2
Sources - Findings of the 1961 AFDC Study
Findings of the 1971 AFDC Study
Chart XIV
1961
Region Total Dead
U.S. 822,700 59,900
U.S. % 100.0 7.7
New Eng. 23,490 5.4
Mass. *12,674 5.4
Incapa-
c itated
143,500
18.1
10.3
10.3
Divorce
118,500
13.7
24.8
24.8
Sep-
arated-
70,800
8.2
14.4
14.4
Deserted
138,900
18.6
13.8
13.8
Not Absent
married for
to Impri- other Other Unem-
mother soned reasons status ployed
192,100 34,800 5,000 13,500 47,700
21.3 4.2 .6 2.2 5.2
19.4 2.5 .4 1.7 7.3
19.4 2.5 .4 1.7 7.3
1971
U.S. 2,523,900 108,700 246,300 358,700 398,800 382,700 700,000 53,
U.S. % 100.0 4.3 9.8 14.2 15.8 15.2 27.7
New Eng. 134,000 2.7 7.3 23.7 22.4 10.8 19.3
Mass. 72,300 2.6 8.0 24.2 23.6 10.7 17.0
* Extrapolated Figure
Sources - Same as chart .XIII
For Massachusetts and New England all figures except total are percentages.
300 31,300 89,500 152,600
2.1 1.2 3.5 6.1
2.1 1.5 5.5 4.6
3.0 1.7 3.6 5.7
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As you can see even with an estimate for Massachusetts
there still is a mild increase in broken families on AFDC
from 1961 to 1971.
The final test considers the proportional change of
broken families on AFDC to total broken families, or stated
mathematically...
Broken families on AFDC (A)
Total broken families (B)
Chart XV presents these results for Massachusetts.
Chart XV
A/B. for Mass.
1961 22.3
1971 81.2
Sources - Bureau of Census 1960 Special Characteristics
of Massachusetts
Bureau of Census 1970 Special Characteristics
of Massachusetts
Findings of the 1961 AFDC Study
Findings of the 1971 AFDC Study
The results from chart XV are quite remarkable. For
some reason, the broken families in Massachusetts have
really increased their numbers on the AFDC rolls.
___ _ __ i43.
In concluding this chapter on Moynihan's theory, I
would have to admit that first, the broken families
phenomona is more characteristic of nonwhite families and
second, that broken families have been a major cause of the
increasing welfare rolls. In the final chapter I will
comment on the policy implications of these results.
I1 1 ______________________________________________
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ChanterIII
In the first part of this third chapter I will analyze
and summarize Piven and Cloward's fascinating book on the
functions of public welfare entitled Regulating the Poor.
In the second part of this third chapter I will attempt
developing a valid procedure to test their hypothesis con-
cerning the welfare crisis. I will conclude this chapter
by applying this test to data obtained for the city of
Boston.
I will exclude the first two parts of their book from
my summary because the contents are not completely relevant.
What the first two parts of their book actually contains is
background material for the final part which focuses on
relief and the urban crisis. Since they develop their
hypothesis quite effectively in this final part of their
book I will give a chapter by chapter description.
They begin this third part by describing the welfare
explosion of the 1960's. During the 1950's the AFDC rolls
rose by only 110,000 families, or 17 percent. But from
December 1960 to February 1969, some 800,000 families were
added to the rolls, an increase of 107 percent in just eighti,
years and two months. In the course of the 1960's, then,
45.
the nation experienced a "welfare explosion" for all
practical purposes, traditional restrictions collapsed and
1
the relief money poured out.
The most striking feature of the welfare rise is the
fact that the rolls went up all at once--by 31 percent in
the first four years of the decade and 58 percent in the
next four years. Put in another way, 71 percent of the
huge welfare increase during the 1960's took place in the
four years after 1964. (Chart I.) It was truly an explosion
Chart II gives an indication of who the contributors
were to the welfare explosion.
In summary, the welfare explosion occurred in all
regions, and in both urban and rural countries. But the
explosion wa6 far greater in urban areas and among those
urban areas it was a handful of the most populous northern
cities that showed the largest rises. Finally, most of the
increase occurred all at once, in just a brief period after
2
1964.
I !
Before beginning to develop their own hypothesis,
Piven and Cloward comment on three other explanations of the
Piven and Cloward, Regulating the Poor, pg. 183-4.
2
Ibid., pg. 189.
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welfare rise.
Chart I
AFDC Caseload Increase By Area
% Change % Change
1950-1960 1960-1969 b
01960-1969
Change
Occurring
After 1964 a
17%National Total
Regions d
Northeast 26
27North Central
West
South
Deep Southe
Other South
107% 71%
180 69
78 59
38 161 72
0 54 86
7
-3
57
52
98
81
121 Major Urban Countiestr 35 165 .. 71
5 Most Populouss 26 217 75
116 Remaining 41 135 68
78 Northern, . . .41 175 - 70
43 Southern' - 121 80
All Less Urban and Rura6
Countics 6 60 - 71
*Northern 2 "'' 17 87 62
&outhern - 43 3  .93
., Includes AFDC-UP. For further definitions, 'see $ource
Tables z and 2 in the Appendix -,
'b Decembcr of each year except February 1969. -
*.,'The periods being comparcd are approximately 'equal, the
earlier being four years, the latter four years and two months.
s defined by the U.S. Bureau. of the Census.
Louisiana, Mississippi, Georgia, Alabama, and South Caro-
lina." The remaining 12 Southern states comprise the Other,
South, as noted in Appendix, Source Table 1. -
A county with a main city of at least 1oo,ooo persons. In
1960, there were 121 such counties, and they contained 130
main cities. See Source Table 2 for an enumeration of these
counties and a discussion of definitions.
' Counties with a main city of at least one million persons;
New York City, which contains five counties, is treated as a
single county.
Counties which do not contain a main city of at least roo,ooo
persons. For convenience, we have referred to these counties
'as "rural" throughout this text. Strictly speaking, many are
not rural, for they contain small cities. A more accurate but
awkward designation would be "less urban or rural."
.i1
one hypothesis points to continued migration of the black
poor from the South. Another attributes the increase to
rising formal benefit levels. And the third fixes responsib-
3
ility on the presumed deterioration of the "Negro Family."
Chart II
Area Contribution to the Welfare Explosin *
4Q
% Contributed to the"
National AFDC Increasi in
950-60 1060-69 i
National Tot .100%, '
Regions -
Northeast - s 33 1 39
North Central 84 17,
West 332
South . 8
Deep South .05 7-q6
Other South .05 2 .
121 Major Urban Counties 80 70
5Most Populous 23 34
116 Remaining 657 3
78 Northern 74 60
43 Southern 6 0
All Less Urbanand 4.4
Rpral Counties 19 0
Northern 25 22
qouthern 6 9
a SEE preceding table fot notations and definkior.
3
Ibid., pg. 189.
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As you can see, they comment on two of the hypothesis
that I intend to use in my thesis; Moynihan's and rising
enefit levels. But Piven and Cloward emphasize that the
premise that the relief rolls automatically grow when the
pool of people eligible for relief grows is extremely doubt-
ful. They proceed to say that this defect makes the
explanations at best incomplete.
As chart III illustrates, black migration has actually
een slowing down.
Chart III
Net Negro OuL-Migratirn '.- A aeAnn ua
Period From the South R ate
1910-1920 -454,000 -145,400
1920-1930 749,000 74,900
1930-1940 -. 4834.800
J1940-1050 - 1,597,000 159,700
1950-1960 V 1,457,000 0,.j." 145,700 t
1960-190 ' '' 613,000 102,000.,'
The number of black families moving northward in the
1950's was greater than in the 1960's, yet the northern
regional increases were from three to seven times larger in
the 1960's. In the northeast, for example, the rolls rose
by 26 percent in the 1950's, but by 180 percent in the
1960's. New York and Los Angeles experienced great in-migra-
tion during the 1950's, not only by southern blacks but by
Spanish-speaking families as well. Nevertheless, the rolls
in these counties went up by only 16 and 14 percent,
49.
respectively. During the 1960's, however, the rolls in both,,
counties quadrupled (300 percent and 293 percent respective-
ly) despite the fact that in-migration by blacks had
4
slackened.
In the 1950's, the national average level of payment
per recipient rose almost by half thus greatly enlarging the
pool; but in fact the rolls rose a mere 17 percent. In the
south, furthermore, average payments went up by half but thell
rolls remained absolutely unchanged. During the 1960's,
these patterns were reversed: a national increase of only
one third in average payment was accompanied by more than
a doubling of the rolls. In short, neither decade provides
5
evidence to support the rising-payment-level thesis.
I would be more interested in seeing the amount of peop-r.
le that were affected by rising benefit levels, followed by
the percentage of these people that were added to the rolls.
What Piven and Cloward might be implying above is that a
50 percent rise in the benefit level should reflect approx-
imately a 50 percent rise in the rolls. This would obvious-H
4
Ibid., pg. 190.
5
Ibid., pg. 191.
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ly not be true unless the rolls were nearly equal to the
population affected by rising benefit levels.
In disagreeing with Moynihan's explanation Piven and
Cloward use a few different arguments. First, they disagree
with Moynihan's assertion that "the steady expansion of the
AFDC program, as of public assistance programs in general,
can be taken as a measure of the steady disintegration of
the Negro family structure over the post generation in the
6
United States.
What Piven and Cloward argue is that the weakening of
the family signified a weakening of social control, espec-
ially over the young, and it was the young who were the most
prominent in the disorders of the 1960's. Disorder, in
turn, was a critical force in producing more liberal relief
practices. So, in essence, what Moynihan did was simply
jump to the conclusion that AFDC rolls rose due to the
changing structure of the black family when in reality ther '
was an intervening variable.
Another conclusion that Moynihan makes is about the
increase in female-headed families on AFDC.
In a detailed examination of this hypothesis, Lurie
6
Daniel Moynihan, Op.cit., pg.14.
7
Irene Lurie, An Economic Evaluation of AFDC, pg.131.
8
Piven and Cloward, 0p. cit., pg. 195.
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found that even if all of the new female-headed families in
the period between 1959 and 1966 had received AFDC assistance
only about 10 percent of the AFDC increase would have been
accounted for. "It is clear, then, that the rise in the
number of families receiving AFDC cannot be explained by
7 
the rise in the number of poor families headed by females.
Finally Moynihan states that urbanization leads to
family deterioration. It turns out a family-deterioration
argument would have to explain why, during the 1950's,
families were more likely to deteriorate in cities of less
than one million persons, whereas in the 1960's the vulner- I
able families had shifted to cities of over one million
persons. What such an explanation would be is not readily
8
apparent.
But of greater importance what none of these explana-
tions account for is the striking fact that 71 percent of
the welfare rise in the 1960's took place after 1964. What
must be explained, in short is not why the pool of eligible
families grew, although the existence of a pool of unemployed;
-52.
poor is one precondition for a welfare explosion; what must
be explained is why so many of the families in that pool
9
were finally able to get on the rolls.
The chapter ends with Piven and Cloward stating their
own hypothesis that the contemporary relief explosion was a
response to the civil disorder caused by rapid economic
change in this case the modernization of southern agriculture.
They spend the remaining part of the book developing this
argument.
The following chapter is about Agricultural Modernization
and Mass Unemployment.
No one would disagree that the rural economy of Americai1
especially in the south, has undergone a profound transforma
tion in recent decades. In 1945, there was one tractor
per farm; in 1964 there were two. Mechanization and other
technological developments, inturn, stimulated the enlarge-
ment of farm holdings. Between 1950 and 1969, one million
farms disappeared; the three million remaining farms averaged
377 acres in size--30 percent larger than the average farm
ten years earlier. The chief and most obvious effect of
these changes was to lessen the need for agricultural labor. I
9
Ibid., pg.196.
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In the years between 1950 and 1965 alone, "new machines
and new methods increased farm output in the United States
10
by 45 percent and reduced farm employment by 45 percent."
When the federal minimum wage law was enaged in 1966,
it exerted pressure for greater labor efficiency which
leads to more investment in machines and fewer jobs for the
poor. Not only did the blacks face unemployment but they
also faced desperate, unhealthy poverty.
With these conditions you would expect the relief rolls
to swell in the south. But they did not. That the southern,
rural relief system did not respond to the dislocation of
people from agriculture is no surprise. Relief restrictions,
continued to serve an economic funtion; while agricultural
modernization meant that less marginal labor was needed, it
did not mean that none was needed. Low paid workers were
still required and a substantial improvement in formal
benefit levels, or a marked easing of access to benefits
11
would have put the availability of that cheap labor in doubt
Another factor contributing to the condition of the black
agricultural worker was the indifference of the plantation
10
Ibid., pg. 201.
11
Ibid., pg. 209.
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owners. Since what happened to these workers did not affect
the owners, they just didn't care. So the choices for the
poor were clear...work or starve... if there was no work,
migrate or starve.
Despite the desperate conditions of many of the poor
there was an absence of disorder in the rural south. There
were mainly three reasons to explain this situation. First,
since the workers became unemployed intermittenly, there was
no mass.upheaval; no real organization. Second, a poor
agricultural worker involved in any type of protest was
severly reprimanded. And finally, there was always the
option available to migrate.
Many pf the blacks did decide to migrate but what they
faced in the cities was, in general, severe unemployment
and underemployment. But the potential for reform did exist
due to the large number of blacks. Chart IV gives an
indication of the high levels which existed in some central
cities.
Chart IV
Average subemployment nine slum-ghetto areas 337
Boston (Roxbury area) 24
New Orleans (several contguous areas) 45
-New York City
Central Harlem -
. East Harlem SS"
Bedford-Stuyvesa 28
Philadelphia (North Piladelphi J4
Phoenix (Salt River Bed area) 42
St. Louis (North Side),; ., 39
anFraneisco (ission-Fillmore) 25
4+
5 5.
As was the case in the south the relief rolls did not
respond to the desperate situation of the blacks. How a
good many of the newcomers to the cities managed to survive
is far from clear.
Chapter 8 in their book focuses on the rise of disorder
in the cities which to Piven and Cloward represent the
crucial causal factor in the welfare crisis.
When the blacks left the south they were cut loose
from their own traditional institutions especially from the
churches and from the established patterns of community
relations that shape and direct people's lives.
The potential for disorder unleashed by these break-
downs might have been moderated if the institutional struc-
tures of the city had absorbed and integrated the newcomers.
What the institutions of the city offered instead was
12
resistance, which worsened the strains toward disorder.
What this weakening of social control led to was the
weakening of the family as an agency of social control for
the young. Also since the young represent the most volatile
age group they are therefore much more sensitive and vulner-1
able to social change. So when there was a high incidence of
12
Ibid., pg. 223.
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family breakdown and unemployment, the younger group reflect'
ed their dissatisfaction through urban disorders. This was
supposedly the missing link in Moynihan's argument.
The main conclusion to be drawn from an appraisal df
the disorder of the 1960's is that old patterns of servile
conformity were shattered... the trauma and anger of an
oppressed people not only had been released, but had been
13
turned against the social structure.
But black disorder had now become politicized as the
following rioter characteristics illustrate:
Comparisons of rioters and nonrioters reveal marked
differences in attitudes toward economic and political
arrangements. First, the rioters were much more likely thani
nonrioters to possess accurate information about the economil
and political condition of blacks. They were also more
resentful than non rioters: "69 percent, as compared with
50 percent of the noninvolved, felt that racial discrimina-
tion was the major obstacle to their finding better employ-
ment." Rioters were more likely to have participated in
protest actions (such as civil rights meetings and demonstra-
13
Ibid., pg. 227.
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tions). Their hostility to whites and their "pride in race"
were significantly greater; they were more likely to be
contemptuous of efforts by local government in their behalf
and they were less likely to feel that "the country was
worth fighting for in the event of a major war." They were
more knowledgeable about the political system even while they
were less likely to feel that traditional electoral arrange-!'
ments afforded efficaious channel to promote justice and
equality for blacks. The rioters were, in short, far more
politicized, alienated and rebellious than their non-rioting
14
contempories.
The final section of chapter 8 deals with the local
responses to disorders. The mayors in the cities where the
black turbulent population was steadily increasing were
faced with quite a dilemma. They had a large number of noisy;
black people who were not receiving their fair share of muni-I
cipal services. But in order to give this black population
their share of services the mayors would be intimidating
their white bloc constituency. Piven and Cloward explain th!
situation exactly...
During the early 1960's, as black voting numbers in the
cities continued to build up and mounting unrest among
14
Ibid., pg. 236.
blacks gave these notes some power, city governments respondI
ed a bit more. To have acceded to some of the demands of
blacks--a halt to urban renewal, intergrated schools, accessjV
to white neighborhoods, apprenticeships in white unions and
the like--would doubtless have spelled the demise of many
political leaders tied to traditional white constituencies,
so blacks got few consessions in these areas.
What they did begin to get was more relief benefits:
more people began to apply for relief, and more of those who V
applied were admitted to the rolls. In all likelihood, thisi
happened because it was easier to give relief than to grant
other concessions. The rising rolls were objectionable to
whites, to be sure, but considerably less so than locating
public housing projects in white neighborhoods, or inter-
15
grating schools or enforcing fair-employment statutes.
But the black population was not the only pressure
that the local governments were feeling. The federal govern-,
ment was also getting into the act. Chapter 9 is devoted tok
explaining the federal intervention.
When the federal government entered into local relief
arrangements, in the 1960's it did so in a novel way. Not
directly through legislative amendments but rather indirectl
15
Ibid. pg. 242.
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through measures which had the consequency of mobilizing
pressure against local relief restriction. In essence it
was one level of government working against another.
Federal intervention occurred along three main lines:
(1) The establishment of new services both public and
private, that offered the poor information about
welfare entitlements and the assistance of experts
in obtaining benefits.
(2) The initiation of litigation to challenge a host of
local laws and policies that kept people off the
welfare rolls.
(3) The support of new organizations of the poor which
informed people of their entitlement to public
welfare and mounted pressure on officials to approve
16
their applications for assistance.
After seeing the involvement of the federal government
one wonders why the intervention actually occurred. Piven 11
and Cloward claim that the black migration northward did
much to weaken the grip of the south on the Democratic PartyL
at least in presidential contests. The trouble was not only
16
Ibid., pg. 250.
in the white south. As southern support eroded, the political
importance of the big cities in presidential contests
agnified, but racial tensions interfered with the ability
of urban politicians to produce the traditional ethnic and
labor pluralities for the national party. In one city
after another, racial strife led to polarization and divisior
within the 'Democratic ranks. Local Democratic leaders in
some cities became so threatened by cleavages in their
constituencies that, to avoid further trouble, they simply
ignored controversial national candidates and worked mainly
to win local contests, a circumstance that severely hurt
17
Stevenson in the campaigns of 1952 and 1956.
A way had to be found to prod the local Democratic
party machinery to cultivate the allegiance of urban black
voters by extending a greater share of municipal services
to them, and to do this without alienating urban white
voters. It was this political imperative that eventually
led the Kennedy and Johnson Administrations to intervene in
the cities, and that intervention had much to do with creatiiq
18
the welfare explosion.
17
Ibid., pg. 254.
18
Ibid., pg. 256.
6 1 .
The federal strategy resulted in programs which
singled out the "inner city" or ghetto as the target area
nd produced new organizations which circumvented municipal
agencies. In this way the federal government was creating H
a direct relationship between the national government and
the ghettoes, a relationship in which both state and local
governments were undercut.
The federal government was actually feeding ammunition
to the blacks because these programs became the instruments
with which the blacks used to get response from the local
governments. Local officials were flabbergasted one level
of government and political party financing the harassment
of the other.
In summary, to reach placate and integrate a turbulent
black constituency, the National Democratic administration
of the 1960's acted to help blacks get more from local
government. To accomplish this goal, it reached past state
and local governments--including Democratic ones--to stimu-
late black demands for service, and in that process it direct-
ed rising black volatility into service protests against
local government. In this way, the relatively limited funds
expended through the great society programs acted as a lever
in redirecting (and increasing) the monies that flowed
k62.
through local agencies. By turning some of the benefits of
these services to blacks, the apparatus of local government
19
as put to work for the national Democratic party.
As was mentioned in the previous chapter federal
intervention proceeded along three lines; welfare rights
services, promoting litigation and nourishing grass-roots
pressure by the poor themselves. Piven and Cloward explain
the local consequences of federal intervention by using these
divisions.
The type of welfare rights services that became most
prevalent in the 1960's was the "storefront service center,"
staffed by social workers, lawyers, churchmen, students and
slum dwellers themselves. Although other great society
programs sponsored local centers, OEO's "community action
agencies" (CAA's) sponsored most of them--perhaps one
thousand in all. "The institution most closely identified
with the CAA's was the neighborhood service center. As
defined by OEO, neighborhood centers serve a definite target
area, offering clients a variety of services or referring them
to other facilities...the centers physical aspects range
from small storefronts to large structures. Their annual k
budgets range from a few thousand to more than a million
dollars. There were (one or more) neighborhood center
Ibd,,9g 281-2.
63.
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programs in some 870 communities in 1968.
The effect of these service centers was to expand the
relief rolls by making the people more aware through infor-
mation, by lowering the personal stigma attached and finally
by reducing the feelings of helplessness. All combined to
expand total relief expenditures.
Chart V and VI illustrate the regional distribution and
the total dollar effort on welfare service centers.
Chart V
Regional Distribution of OLU
Community Action Agencies
April 1969
NUMBER
National 963 100
Northeast 186 19
North Central 233 24
West 140 15
South 404 42
Deep South 121 13
Other South 283 29
Source: OEO
Notes: Coterminous United States; distributions by urban4ural
were not available.
20
Sar A. Levitan, The Great Society's Poor Law: A New
Approach to Poverty, pg. 128.
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Chart VI
Total Dollar Efort for Community Action Agencies
by OEO and Localities
Fiscal 1968
%K
Millions Urban Rural
of Dollar Dollar
Dollars % Effort Effort
National 1,120 100
Urban 851 76 100
Rural 269 24 100
Northeast 249 21
Urban 220 20 26
Rural 19 2 7
North Central 241 22
Urban 196 18 23
Rural 45 4 17
West 213 19
Urban 189 17 22
Rural 35 2 9
South 426 38
Urban 246 22 29
Rural .180 16 67
beep South' 156 -' 14 -:
Urban 73 7 9
-Rural 83 731,
Other South 270 24
Urban 172 -'15 20
Rural 98 9 -36
9. '9-. I -'
:,Source: OEO, Community Action Agency Analysis Report as of
11|/2 2|/69.-
C Notes: Colerminous United States; columns may not total
, .properly because of rounding; dollar,effort includes a small
proportion of money appropriated by localities as a condition
of receiving OEO funds. In this table, we follow OEO's defini-
lion of urban: counties with a subdivision containing more
persons
_____ ____'65.
A series of judicial decisions in the 1960's had the
effect of undermining some of the regulations by which the
relief rolls have been kept down. For decades, reformers
had lobbied unsuccessfully for legislative repeal of
residence laws, man-in-the house rules, and employable
mother rules. But in the 1960's these foundation blocks
of the "poor law" were washed away by one court decision
21
after another.
These changes were brought about by lawyers employed
by the different neighborhood service centers. These lawyers
promoted institutional change throughout law reform by
taking test cases whose outcome affected existing or
potential welfare recipients as an entire class.
Chart VII gives an indication of the distributor of
attorneys throughout the service centers.
(Chart VII on following page.)
21
Piven and Cloward, Op. cit. pg. 306.
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Chart VII
b' ' butio' O Neighborhuua Legal
e ices ttorneys, Fiscal 1969
Jt 2% %
URBAN RURAL
'jUMBER AITORNEYS ATTORNEYS
tonal 1796 100%
Urban 1084 60 100%
-712 40 00%
orteas631 35
ra.403 22 37
Rual 228 13 . 32
Jorth er tra,, 394 22
Ur1 ar 257 14 24
Ru ra i "114 1371 8 19
est 394 22
Urban '1, 202 11 19
Rura 198 11 27
uth377 21
SUrban' 225 12 21
Rutal*, 154 9 22
M Diep South 99 5 .
.Urban- 52 3 5
u ra 47 s T 7
jOther South1i 278 , 15
Urban 171 10 16.
Rural 101 6 15
Souce OEO
Note Coterminous United States; columns may not total prop.
erly because of rounding. In this table, we follow OEO's defi.
sli6n of urban: counties wihhu a subdivision containing more
i san eoo.per ons. .
The grass-roots protest that developed during this
period resulted in the formation of the National Welfare
Rights Organization (NWRO) which sponsored many important
and influential demonstrations and campaigns.
_________________________________________________________________________ 
...--.
Li.
67.
In the end of this chapter Piven and Cloward comment
on applications and approval rates. In both cases there
is a substantial positive change. Chart VIII illustrates
the average annual applications received while chart IX
illustrates the amount approved.
Chart VIII
* 1'1vCrage Annual Applications Received
(in thousands)
1960-64 1965-68 % CHANGE
National 745 962 29
NortheastY i' 226 280 24
V i North Central - i135 149 10
West 148 - 285 93
S th 236 247 5
ep South 79 82 4Qh uth L166 165 6
Chart IX
etage Annual Applications Approved
1960-64 965-48 %CHANGE
Nata ~ 59 66 12
Northeast 66 73 11
orth$entraI 62 67 8
test 59 67 '14
South 50 58 16
Deep South 44 . 54 23
'Other South 52 59 13
i I I :
These two measures will be of considerable value when
I attempt determining a valid testing procedure for their
hypothesis.
In concluding, because the 1960's were a time of
profound disorder, both north and south, government respond-
ed with measures to ease that disorder. Blacks got a littleL
more from some government agencies and suffered a little less!
at the hands of others, although considering the magnitude
of the political disturbance, it is remarkable to see how
few and how modest these concessions were, and how often
they turned out to be merely symbolic. Now that ghetto
unrest has subsided (at least of this writing), the liber-
alization of relief practices stands out, for without that
concession the victims of agricultural modernization and of
persisting unemployment in the cities would remain perilously
close to starvation--as so many did in the late 1940's and L
the 1950's. And although the processes by which the relief
expansion occurred were sometimes covert and circuitous,
the moral seems clear: a placid poor get nothing, but a
22
turbulent poor sometimes get something.
22
Ibid., pg. 338.
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In this last part of Chapter III I will attempt deter-
mining a valid testing procedure for Piven and Cloward's
theory on civil disorder. I will use this test on data
hich I have accumulated for the city of Boston.
As in chapter II the best approach would probably
involve some type of correlation, regression or causal
analysis. Obviously this would require the use of a computes
and as stated in the previous chapter I do not have access t
one.
Before I attempt devising my own method, I would like
to include some helpful information from a Rand Corporation
Publication entitled Protest by the Poor: A Study of the
Welfare Rights Movement in New York City. It was done in
September of 1972 by Larry Jackson and William A. Johnson.
In summary this study is concerned with two broad
issues. First, it analyzes the origins, growth and tactics
of protest groups involved with welfare in New York City.
Second, it examines whether these groups have been responsible
in part, for the recent increase in New York City's AFDC
rolls. At the same time the study considers other factors,
such as, rising grant levels and liberalized acceptances
23
thought to have influenced the city's caseload.
23
Larry Jackson and William A. Johnson, Rand Corporatio4:
Protest by the Poor, pg. 5.
24
Ibid., pg. 232.
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I am more interested in the second part of their study
which deals with the relationship between rising welfare
incidence and group disorder. This corresponds directly
to Piven and Cloward's theory.
Jackson and Johnson begin their model by stating that
at any point in time a change in caseload (C) can be
expressed as a function of the acceptance rate (r), applica-
tions (A), and the closings rate (K) . This relationship
is illustrated by the following equation:
C = r A - KC
Which states that the increase in the caseload is equal
to openings less closings. The level of closings, however,
also depends on the overall size of the caseload. At any
point in time, a certain number of cases will turn over as
24
a matter of course depending on the size of the caseload.
Chart X and XI give an indication of the importance of
each one of these three decision variables in determining
the use in the welfare caseload.
7 1.
Chart X
PERCENTAGE OF TlE AFDC CASELOAD ATTRIBUTABLE" TO CHANGES
IN DECISION VARIABLES BETWEEN 1966 and 1970
(Percent)
Compo~ient of the Case-Compopent of the Case-
Load [ncrease Due to:
U1igher Acceptance Rates
UIigher Number of Applications
Acted Upon
Lower Closings Rate
All Three Variables Working
Simultaneously
Percent of the
Caseload Increase
8.4.
33.1
25.9
60.6
Chart XI
DICISION VARIABLES AFECTING NEW YORK CITY S
AFDC CASELOAD
1966 through 1970
Annual Acceptance
Rate
(r )
Year percentage
1966 69. &A
1967 76.1
1968 .7 79. 1
1969 72.8,
1970 72.1
Applications
Acted Upon
(A)
66, 401
78,744
91,139
81,366
97,079
Annual
Closings Rate
(k)
(percentag)
32.6
28.4
25.6
25.4
21.3
Source: Computed from data presented iii New York City, Department of
Social Services,;Monthly Statistical Report, various months.
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As the authors point out at the end of this chapter,
this exercise is only a beginning. The important quest-ion
is why each of these three decision variables has changed
over time resulting in the unprecedented growth in the
welfare rolls.
Jackson and Johnson use two variables to measure Welfare
Rights Activity: membership in local welfare rights organi-
zations as a percentage of district caseloads (m) and after
April 1968, the number of demonstrations held at each welfare;
center (b). This is very valuable data yet unobtainable for
Boston or even Massachusetts. Still I would like to include1
their equations in my thesis.
The equations for the three decision variables (r)
acceptance rate, (A) Applications and the closings rate (K)
are:
(1) r =a + a m + a D + as + E
Where:
m = membership
D = demonstration
s = closings- for failure to comply with departmental
policy, test for relative stringing of Welfare
Center Administration
E = Error term
73.
(2) A= b + b m +bD +br +b G + E
Where:
m, D and E are same as preceding page and:
r = acceptance rate
G = average grant per case
(3) K = c + c m + cID + c s + cG + E
Where:
m, D, s, G and E are the same also. A problem
with the above equations is that G, the grant level, is alsoi
a dependent variable so it too has a separate equation.
Jackson and Johnson do obtain results but they are not
totally convincing, although it is extremely difficult to
get impressive results using statistics in social science.
In gathering data for Boston I was able to obtain acces§
to the Public Assistance Monthly Statistical Report. This
is a document which is completed by all the cities in
Massachusetts then submitted to the Research and Planning
25
office at the State Department of Welfare.
This form contains many important statistics concerning
applications, caseload and expenditures. Unfortunately
many of these reports were consolidated before I could re-
search them. The consolidation procedure excluded many
important pieces of data including acceptance rates, closingg
25clda a-lon1aqs78ac79
'74.
and number of monthly applications. When I spoke to Harold
Doherty, Director of Research and Planning, he informed me
of the following statement, "When my supervisor told me to
clean house, the statistical reports were the first to go."
I asked why. Mr. Doherty claimed that no one ever inquired
about past statistical reports so they were considered
practically useless. Besides, most of the "important" (yet
useless to me) information was preserved on the consolidated
26
form.
I did manage to obtain the statistical reports for the i
years 1968 through 1972. I will utilize this data to'test
Piven and Cloward's theory. What I will do is observe the
changes in applications, acceptance rates and closing rates
from 1968 to 1972 and compare them to the figures in the
Rand study and in Piven and Cloward's Regulating the Poor.
Before concluding this chapter I would like to make
a few pertinent comments about my testing procedure. Although
I am using applications, acceptance rate and closings to
substantiate the civil disorder theory they do possess a
couple of common deficiencies.
26
This information only included total figures on
recipients and expenditures.
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A liberalizing acceptance rate may be concealed due to
a number of opposing forces. Working to raise the rates
could be a turnover in social workers resulting in liberal-
ized "gatekeepers." Also, changes in eligibility require-
ments and rising benefit levels could result in an increase
in rates. At the same time non-eligible applicants floodingI
the welfare centers upon hearing of administrative loosenesst
may lower the acceptance rates.
These opposing forces are also at work against the
other two measures...applicants and closings.
The other deficiency is the time period from which my
data is taken. It does not correspond with the welfare
acitvity period in New York City. Although in Boston it may
have been different, I will go on the assumption that my
indicators should be similar to the ones that have resulted
in New York City due to the disorder. This implies that theY
Welfare Rights Activity has occurred before the time period
of my data.
The following is a brief summary of my testing procedure.
Chart XII
(l)
dApplications 41Applications 6Applications!
for Boston = for New York City = Piven - Cloward
L76-.
(2)
aAcceptance rates %4Acceptance rates ,AAcceptance rates
for Boston = for New York City = for Piven -
Cloward
(3)
6Closings J Closings dClosings for Piven
for Boston = for New York City = Cloward
In this final section of chapter III I will apply the
procedure developed to test Piven and Cloward's theory
on data which I have obtained for the City of Boston. As
indicated by chart XIIthe procedure examines three separate
indicators; applications, acceptance rates and closings.
I will loek at each measure individually then summarize at
the end of the chapter.
Appilications
Using the Monthly Statistical Report I have computed a
total applications figure for the years 1969 through 1972.
I have chosen the second category in the statistical report
entitled Applications received during month to compare with
Piven and Cloward's data and the Rand data on New York City.
Chart XIII illustrates the results for the City of Boston.
Applications Received during
Month
9,014
8,763
1969
1970
1971
1972
15,474
11,529
27
Monthly Statistical Reports January 1969 - November
1972.
If you try to compare the above chart with either Piven
and Cloward's data (chart VIII) or the Rand New York' City
data (chart XI) you will see that there is no relationship
whatsoever. Instead of using applications received during
month, chart ,XIV illustrates the results by using applicatiors
terminated as a comparative measure.
27
For 1972 I only had the data for 11 months so I
computed for the twelfth month by adding on an average month
f-or-1972 --- - _--_-____
Source:
1:77.
Chart XIII
Year
:78.
MONTHLY STATISTICAL REPORT
A. Applications
1. pending from last month
2. received during month
3. total during month
4. applications terminated
a. payment authorized
b. denied or other reasons
5. pending at end of month
Cases Approved for Assistance
1. continued from last month
2. added during month
a. new
b. reopened
c. transferred from other city or town
3. total open during month
a. received assistance
1. many payments
2. vendor payments for medical only
b. received no assistance
4. closed during month
a. tansferred
b. not transferred
(continued on following pg.)
B.
5. continued to next month
6. closed cases receiving payments
C. Payments
1. many payments
2. vendor payments
D. AFDC Recipients
1. adults
2. children
Chart XIV
year
1969
1970
1971
1972
Source: Same as chart XIII
applications terminated
8863
9558
9091
28
4139
Again trying to compare the charts give no results othei
than either applications are not a valid indicator or civil
disorder was not present. I tend to believe the former.
28
Same as footnote number 27.
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Measures taken from Monthly Statistical Report.
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I determined my acceptance rates by performing the
following division:
payment authorized 29
applications terminated
Chart XV illustrates the results for 1969 through 1972
for Boston.
Chart XV
year acceptance rate
1969 95.36
1970 95.01
1971 92.18
30
1972 71.97
Source: Same as chart XIII
These acceptance rates are extremely high as compared
to either of the ones presented by Piven and Cloward or the
Rand study. But I think that these results are favorable
to the theory offered by Piven and Cloward. Namely that
liberalization in welfare administration expands and contracts
depending upon the presence of civil disorder. As the figures
clearly show the rates are steadily decreasing reflecting the
non-existence of civil unrest. The figures in the Rand
study (chart XI) reflect the same result.
I determined my closings rate by performing the
following division:
closed during month 31
total cases open during month
The results for 1969 through 1972 for Boston are given
by Chart XVI.
Chart XVI
year closings
1969 2.08
1970 1.78
1971 2.02
32
1972 1.83
Source: Same as chart XIII
Although Piven and Cloward do not offer any data for
closings rate theirs would probably reflect an increase in
closings after 1968. This would be due to the contraction
of the welfare administration after the disappearance of
civil disorder. The figures for New York City show a decreat
sing rate while my figures for Boston show a bit of both.
I would have to conclude that the closings rate is not a
good indication.
31
Measures taken from Monthly Statistical Report.
32
__ __32__ 
__ __ __ _ __ _ ____ _
It seems that the only valid measure in this testing
procedure was acceptance rate at least for Boston, while
the other two were not useful at all. But, as mentioned
earlier, acceptance rates may be concealed due to opposing
faces.
T
82.
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Chapter IV
As in the preceding ones the first half of this chapter
will contain a detailed summary of David M. Gordon's theory
on the welfare crisis. In essence it will be a description
of his article entitled Income and Welfare in New York City
in the magazine the Public Interest. In the second section
of this chapter I will attempt determining a valid testing
procedure for his hypothesis and then apply it in the third
section.
Gordon begins his article by stating that before you
can begin analyzing the welfare crisis you must investigate
income distribution. Serious attention to the shape of
the income distribution is overdue, for many recent debates
about public policy have depended completely on our assump-
tions about changes in the dispersion of income. In New York
City, examples abound. If we knew how many poor people live
in the city and how those numbers had been changing during
the 1960's we could begin to choose sensibly among the welte
of conflicting explanations for the rapid growth of welfare
1
in New York.
As indicated by chart I, the white families in New York'
David M. Gordon, Income and Welfare in New York City,
-Public Interest, g. 65.
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are better off than the nonwhite.
Chart I
lncorme Distribution of New
nicity, January 196S. >
wcbz - WHITE
-MCASS FAMILIES
.$1000) N. % NO.
10-1 17,000
1-2 35,500
2-3 - 55,600
b 3-4 78,800
4-5 101,900
5-6 173,000
6-7 185,400
8-9 132,800
9-10 02,700
10-11 78,800
1i1-12 63,300
12-13 52,500
13-.14 .'44,800
14-15 37,000
15 & over 222,500
1.1
2.3
3.6
.15.1
6.3
11.2
12.0
11.2
8.6
6.0
5.1
4.1
3.4
2.0
2.4
14.4
20,600
63,100
69,500
120,200
76,800
70,5CO
60,000
41,400
. 25,000
18,903
10,400
5,500
4,300
2,400
1,200
17,000
1,546,000 100.0 608,700 100.0 2,153,900 100.0
*Refers to total income earned during 1967. All numbers have been
IQ. ColusMa may not add to %otals owing to rounding.
rounddc- to the nearcat
Due to the difference in family sizes in chart I
Gordon defines five standardized income classes with the
following descriptions:
Class I - "poor" families; $0 to $3,500 annual income
for a family of four.
Class II - "low income" families earning between the
-41 ii --
York Cily Far lics by Eth.
BLACK AND
PUETO
]RICAN
do
TOTAL
3.3
10.6
11.4
19.6
12.6
11.7
10.0
4.1
3.1
1.7
0.0
0.7
0.4
0.2
2.9
37,600
98,600
125,100
399,000
178,700
243,500
246,300
214,400
157,800
111,00
89,200
68,800
57,8C
47,2C0
38,200
240,103
1.7
4.0
0.2
2.7
11.3
.10.0
-7.0
5.2
.3.2
2.7
2.2
A'
1 1.1
Total
85
Class III -
Class IV -
Clasp V -
After dividing the population into the above classes
Gordon makes the following observations.
(1) As chart II indicates most people in New York live1
sparely.
'(Chart II on following page.)
2
Ibid., pg. 71.
poverty line and the "lower than moderate"
budget level; $3,500 to $6,000 for a family
of four.
"modest income" families receiving between
the "lower than moderate" and "modest but
adequate" standards; $6,000 to $9,400 for
a family of four.
"moderate income" families receiving betweenl
the "modest but adequate" and the "higher
than moderate" standards; $9,400 to $14,500
for a family of four.
"affluent families" receiving above the
"higher than moderate" budget level; above
2
$14,500 for a family of four.
Chart II
Distribution of New York residents and familics* among
"constant consumption" income classes, January 1968.
:86.
PZR CENT PER CENT OF
CLASS OF PEPLE FAMILIES
I Poor families 15.3 10.7Il Low income families 21.2 18.7
IlI Modest income families 27.0 27.9IV Moderate income families 19.5 2,3.4V Affluent families X7.0 19.4
100.0 100.0
Excluding families with heacs sixty-fie years or older.
(2) As chart III indicates black and Puerto Rican
families are truly over represented in the lower classes.
Chart III
Distribution of faimilies* in New York nmong "constant
consumption" income classes, January 1968, by ethnicity.
PERA CENT
OF WHITe!
FAMItl~S*INCOME CLASS
PER CENT OF
BLACK AND PUERTO RICAN
FAM ILIES'
I Poor families 3.7 28.4
11 Low income families 13.G 31.1
III Modest income families 29.6 23.3
IV Moderate income families 27.5 13.0
V Affluent families 25.6 4.2
100.0 100.0
*Excluding farmilies with heads of sixty-fave and over.
ilL.. -- -- ______ _________ -- ~..-
r
(3) Households without children live quite comfortably
in New York while families with children have more difficulty.
(4) If you take the third observation and differentiati
by ethnicity the results are staggering. The large, poor
black families make the majority of the lower classes.
(5) As chart IV indicates the distribution of minority
households simply lags one class behind.
Chart IV
Per Ccis in Family Size Groups.'
SINGLES AND 4, 5, 6, on MonE
COOPES OE CHLD, MMERS TOTAL
I White households in
Classes IV-V 57.8 25.9 16.3 100.0
Minority households in
Classes III-IV 57.0 26.4 16.6 100.0
2 White households in
Classes 11-III 19.7 29.7 50.6 100.0
Minority households in
Classes I-II 23.2 26.4 50.4 100.0
Excludiag families headed by the elderly.
What these observations lead to is
in New York City is divided mainly into
(11 White families with children.
(Classes II-III)
(2) White families with children.
(Classes IV-V)
that
four
the popu
"cells. "
lation
(3) Minority families with children.
(Classes I-II)
(4) White households without children.
(Classes IV-V)
As chart V indicates.
Chart V
Distribtion of Residents and Households* arnong
Sociocconomic Croups.
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NUMBER
PEOPLE
PER CENT
OF TOTAL
PEOPLE
PER CENT
OF
14OUSEHOLDS
Four major groups
a. White families with
childrenl (Classes 11-111)
b. white families with
children (Classes IV-V)
c. Minorit - families with
chi dren (Classes 1-11)
d. White households without
children (Classes IV-V)
Six minor groups
U. Minority families with
children (Class III)
b. White households without
children (Classes 1-111)
c. Minority households without
Children ( Classes 1-111)
d. Minority households without
children (Classes IV-V)
e. White families with
children (Class 1)
I. Minority families with
Cchildrein (Classes IV-')
2,161,936
1,466.042
1.454.009
923,684
3.56,835
271.336
230.364
19P,361
143,900
132.100
7.335.567
29.4 21.2
20.0 16.8
19.8 12.6
12.6 22.9
4.9 4.1
3.7 7.1
3.2 7.0
2.6 5.0
1.8 1.5
2.(o 1.8
100.0 00.0
I.
As a result,
the city's economy.
these groups dominate the life style of
They will continue to do so in the
future.
The next question that Gordon addresses is whether the
situation has changed since 1960. As charts VI and VII
illustrate, whites have improved their economic position
since 1960, whereas minority groups have not.
Chart VI
Family Income Distribution for Whites, New Y
1960 and 1968 Compared (in Constant 1968 Dollars).
1I5'F
20.0-
5.0-
100o
, -
5.0
5 10 5
income Class (41.0m)
ork City,
______________________ tt-. _______________
i i
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Chart VII
Family Income
New York City. 1960 and
20.0
15.0
i 10.0-
u
50h*
Distribution for blacks and Puerto Ricans,
1968 Compared (in Constant 196 Dollars).
I9GS~
196
5 10
Income Class ($.coo)
I
15 .2'
90.
91.
Finally before moving to the question of the welfare
burden, Gordon makes the following conclusions about the
changes in poverty in New York City during the 1960's. Thes4
conclusions are based on adjusted data from the Social
Security Administration.
(1) There has been very little decline since 1960 in
the number of New York families living in poverty.
(2) Though slight, the decrease in poor families in
New York reflected greater improvement than in the other twoi
large American cities for which similar comparisons can be
made.
(3) The composition of poor families in New York has
changed radically since 1960.
(4) The absolute numbers of poor minority families
increased very rapidly as well.
(5) Both relatively and absolutely, the trends in
minority group poverty traced a very different path in New
3
York from that in other central cities.
In commenting on New York City's welfare burden Gordon
claims that the persistence of poverty by itself does not
go very far in explaining it. By comparing New York City
to Chicago and Los Angeles he found that New York had about
3
Ibid., pg. 79-80. ____
92.
twice as many poor families as Chicago, but almost three
times as many welfare clients. Also New York had around
three times as many poor families as Los Angeles - Long
4
Beach, but almost four times as many people on welfare.
The explanation is probably due to the higher benefit
levels in New York. In February 1968, recipients of Aid
to Families with Dependent Children received an average
of $60.60 a month in New York; $44.70 in Illinois, and
$44.75 a month in California. The ratio of AFDC recipients
to numbers of poor families is greater in New York City
than in the other two cities by roughly the same degree as
the average grants per AFDC recipients in New York are
5
higher.
Chart VIII represents the size of the New York City
Public Assistance caseload as it grew during the 1960's.
Chart VIII
Number of Public Assistance Recipients in Neo York
City.
NUMBER
DATE (TO NEA REST 1,000)
January 1934 411.000
January 1936 533.000
January 1938 807.000
June 1938 872,000
November 1938 961,000
January 1969 995,000
4
Ibid., pg. 80.
5
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Gordon poses three possible hypotheses for these in-
creases. First, the number receiving welfare could have
grown because an increasing percentage of those eligible for
welfare actually chose to receive it (or because the rules
permitting eligibles to receive it had become more liberal).
Second, even if the benefits available under welfare had not
increased at all, the number of people on welfare could have
increased because the numberof eligibles increased. This
could have occurred because of a downward shift in the incomq
distribution due to in-migration or to the lag of wages
behind prices in certain kinds of jobs. Third, even if the
income distribution (measured in constant prices) did not
change at all as a result of migration or wage-price effects
the number of people eligible for welfare could have increas7
ed because the welfare grant levels (measured in constant
prices) increased over time, effectively blanketing into
6
eligibility large numbers of the population.
After examining income distribution data Gordon poses
the following conclusion; the largest source of the increase
in welfare stemmed from the increase in real grant levels,
that changes in the income distribution accounted for a
6
Ibid., pg. 83.
___________ 
II, - .
smaller share, and that those eligible for welfare showed
7
no greater propensity to join the rolls.
Gordon concludes his report with the following chart
(IX) which has the following implication.
Chart IX
I,
'*1'
Stotistical COmponents of 1ncreave of ropie inl Fami'-s
Eligile or Pulic Assistace (Excluding Those Sixty-fie
and Ocr) 'Nete York City, Jauiary Wb1 to .Nocciib r
* . *-ABSO(LUTE?
pJNtAY ET TOTAL
Nv*btul 1964 INc:IAs: NCEAS
Nuznhetr of eligibles
l Janukary 1964 605,O(
2 Numjer 'who would ave
been ieligible in Novemb~er;
1968 1964 grant
-evels were in ewcet
3 Nunber who would havebeen teligible in Novcze ,
190 November 1968 -
grant flevels weke in effeqt
-1nd if the January 1964
income ditrilution
had described the
situation in 4
November 1968
-4 Actual number of
eligibles in November
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* distribution, .621 ,
172,000 172,000
637,000 465,000
1,016,000. 379,000
1.016.000
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If New York state had not decided to offer people an
income at least equal to what the federal government calls
the poverty line, there would be no welfare crisis at all.
8
We would, in its place, have a far greater amount of poverty.
As in the previous two chapters, I will conclude
chapter IV by attempting to determine a valid testing
procedure for Gordon's theory on rising benefit levels.
I will in essence, be duplicating Gordon's method which:
he uses in his article for New York City. I will obtain
census data for family income in the Boston area then compare
this with the income for people on AFDC. This income will
be computed by using a monthly benefit level.
Even with this simple test I will have to encounter two
major problems. First, census data is only given for SMSA's!
(Standard Metropolitan Statistical Area) and therefore, I
will have to make some type of assumption or adjustment.
Second, there is no average benefit level in existence for
Massachusetts or for any other state. The reason for this
is that all AFDC cases are not alike. Some families may be
receiving the maximum amount while others due to income may
be receiving the iminimum.
There are two ways to attack this problem. First, I
8
________Ibid., pg-. 86.
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can simply compute an average by taking the total case
figure and dividing it into total expenditures or I can
compute standard budgets by using the Public Assistance
Policy manual. When I perform this test for Massachusetts
I will discuss which method I will utilize.
Chart X briefly summarizes my testing procedure.
Chart X
Family income for Family income for
Massachusetts Massachusetts AFDC recipients
Percent of families with Recipients eligible by
or
AFDC income on AFDC income
In this final section of chapter IV I will apply the
testing procedure developed above to data obtained for the
city of Boston.
The best approach to Gordon's theory probably would have
been to compare data on AFDC income and family income for a
couple of years, but due to the unavailability of income
data for non-census years I will have to limit myself to thef
year of 1969. What I will do is observe the potential
recipients and see how many are actually on AFDC. This willI
involve three basic steps. First, determining a yearly AFDC!
budget. Second, determining the amount of families that fall
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within this budget range and finally the proportion of these
eligibles that are actually on AFDC.
First, determining a,yearly AFDC budget. Instead of
trying to create an average size for an AFDC family with
average problems, I simply took the total payments for each
month and divided by the case load for each month. On the
Monthly Statistical Report it would be:
cases continued from last month
total payments
Chart XI illustrates the average monthly payments for
1969.
Chart XI
Month Average Payment
January 304.54
February 277.00
March 276.48
April 234.45
May 292.78
June 270.54
July 265.54
August 282.38
September 260.54
October 362.89
i 1
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Month Average Payment
November 276.51
December 283.55
Total AFDC yearly budget: 3386.96
Source: Monthly Statistical Report January - December 1969.
The variation in payments gives an indication of the
difficulty that would be involved in trying to determine an
average budget in another manner.
The second step is to determine the amount of families
that fall within this range. Using the census material I
classified the following people as potential AFDC recipients:
Male Head
Married wife present
Wife in labor force
With own children less than 18 (1)
Wife not in labor force
With own children less than 18 (2)
H
Female Head
In labor force
Widowed
With own children less than 18 (3)
Other marital status
With own children less than 18 (4)
Not in labor force
Widowed
With own children less than 18 (5)
Other marital status
With own children less than 18 (6)
ource; 1970 Bureau of the Census
Massachusetts
Special Characteristics
The results for each income group are illustrated in
:hart XII on next page.
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Chart XII
Income group
Less than $1,000
$1,000 - $2,000
$2,000 - $3,000
$3,000 - $4,000
Total 22,325
1970 Bureau of the Census
Massachusetts
Total families
6432
4970
7427
34969 (8739)
Special Characteristics
Finally the third step is to determine the proportion
of eligibles actually on AFDC. Taking the total case figure
from the December 1969 Monthly Statistical Report you come
out with an astounding result. The total caseload for
December 1969 was 20,825 while the number of families eligiba
for AFDC in 1969 was 22,325. And the 22,325 families are fot
the Boston SMSA which includes many of the Boston suburbs.
So, in concluding, the poorer families with children
are really -taking advantage of their AFDC opportunity.
9
Since the AFDC yearly budget was approximately $3400
I took four-tenths of the total families falling between the
income level 3000-4000 resulting in 3496.
ISource:
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This final chapter will be divided into two parts. In
the first part, I will draw some conclusions based on my
results and comment on the policy implications involved with
these conclusions. In the second part of the chapter I will
complete my thesis by posing suggestions for future researchJ
Part I
From the numerous tests that I performed in the precediI
chapters, there were three results that stood out:
(1) The occurrence of broken families among the non-
whites.
(2) The vast increase in the proportion of broken
families actually receiving AFDC.
(3) The success of the low income families with child-
ren in getting on AFDC.
Before I draw any implications from these results I
would like to mention a few relevant facts about my testing
procedures.
a.) As I stated a number of times in each of the
chapters, the best approach to testing the theorie
probably would have been to utilize some type of
Social Science Statistical Program such as SPSS.
In this way, I would have been able to measure
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mathematically the importance of each of the
indicators. But as also mentioned due to the lack
of computer time and available data I was not able
to apply this approach. My point is that instead
of standardizing the tests for each theory I'm
faced with analyzing the results individually then
having to comment on the success of each theory
individually rather than measuring relative
effectiveness. For example, instead of comparing
the relative contribution of Moynihan's theory
against Gordon's, I'm faced with simply stating
that for my data they are both contributing to the
welfare crisis.
b.) Since these theories did involve varying amounts
of data it was difficult to determine whether or
not my data was similar to the data that authors
were using for their results. I'm told this
inconsistency of data poses many problems in the
field of social science research.
What these two facts about my testing and data imply is
Even if I were able to develop a complex regression
analysis techniques, I'm sure that the interpretation would
be quite difficult.
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that my technique was probably not the most sophisticated
ever developed. Therefore, when one interprets my results
he must keep this in mind. Although with the data, time and
other materials I had available I feel my effort was worth-
while.
In making a conclusion about my results I would have to
say that in Massachusetts as in most states nonwhite familie
have more of a tendency to dissolve. And these families
along with a greater number of white families with low income
and with children are really making their presence felt on
AFDC. Obviously, this is not a profound statement because
I'm sure that it has been substantiated before and besides,
who is the AFDC program supposed to serve? This brings us tc
the policy implications involved with these conclusions.
I would like to take different approaches to this
problem. I'll call the first approach the WIPE-OUT POLICY
and the second the LAISSEZ-FAIRE POLICY. These two approache
represent two extremely different concepts that policy-makerq
would probably follow in designing programs to deal with the
2
problem.
2
These are strictly personal views.
V
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Wipe-Out Policy
This policy has as its objective to wipe-out the AFDC
program as much as possible. It also assumes that broken
3
familes are an unnatural social phenomona and are closely
related to income. So what these policymakers would concludq
is that you would keep down the AFDC rolls if you could keepi
families together. This would leave you with widowed mothers,
wives whose husbands have been incapacitated and maybe a few!
divorce cases. This would obviously result in a drastic
decrease in AFDC rolls as my charts in chapter II indicate.
But then how would the families be kept together? Subsidiza-t
tion of income? Better jobs? These questions are beyond
the scope of my study.
Laissez-Faire Policy
These policymakers would indicate that broken families
are bound to occur despite income and that welfare agencies
should not be concerned because if there were not a large
number of people on AFDC there would be desperate poverty
among many families.
I tend to believe a bit of both theories. Namely that
3
These include families which are divorced, separated,
deserted or not married to mother.
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AFDC should be reduced but some policy has to provide for
the care of poorer families with children. Despite the
varying objectives both policies focus on one phenomona...
"the broken family" therein the solution lies.
And finally despite the varying techniques utilized it
is quite difficult to choose from different models which are
supposed to represent reality. Even though the model may
satisfy many tests you cannot consistently and successfully
mechanize
A.
B.
C.
human behavior.
Part II
4
(Suggestions for future research)
If studies similar to mine could be performed for
different cities throughout the United States I'm
sure the results would be quite valuable.
Data bases developed specifically for social science.
research throughout the United States would make
research a much easier task.
Finally and most important, if a standardized testing
procedure involving all the independent variables
related to welfare could be developed, it would
make research in that area much easier.
4
There were many minor specific suggestions that I had
throughout my study but the ones below are more generalized.
1'U
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